ST Titan / Project Titan

GAA §5.2 stack: $66,000,000 Triumph + $15,000,000 City Matching Funds + $35,000,000 from the MRO Lessee (VT) + $94,125,000 other sources = $210,125,000 for Project Titan; the entire MRO Campus is estimated at $334,825,000. The City bears ALL cost overruns; the Grant is partial funding only.

The grant sequence, per the contemporaneous primary record: the Triumph board approved $56M on July 18, 2018 (contingent on all other funding by year-end, later extended to 2019-03-31) → term sheets at $56M (Oct 2018) → the City asked for an additional $12.5M on 2019-02-08 → the executed GAA (2019-04-29) is $66M, structured as $56M plus two $5M tranches contingent on Triumph's 2020/2021 state receipts (§9.6). The registry's "#120 · $66,000,000 · 2018-03-16" listing line carries a dated discrepancy annotation; the memo governs the sequence.

The "fully funded" project was $44,875,000 short ten weeks before execution — documented in the City's own words and table: actual committed funding stood at $165,250,000 of $210,125,000 in February 2019, because the application-stage forecast had not materialized (FDOT delivered $25M against a $50M request; Federal EDA $12.25M against $17M; JGGF Year-2 $10M against $15M; County $10M against $12M; the City itself over-delivered +$2M; and $10.125M was already disclosed short at application). The closure plan was assembled in ONE WEEK: +$5M City + $5M County + a $20M further FDOT request + $2.375M City-anticipated + a $12.5M additional Triumph ask. Recorded neutrally: gap-closing is what diligent staff do; the record's contribution is that the announced stack and the assembled stack now both exist, dated.

The pressure clock, in the City's words: "by February 14, ST must be able to make a corporate decision about either proceeding with Project Titan in Pensacola or seeking an alternative to their business plans elsewhere" — a two-week corporate ultimatum cited to the board alongside the March 31 Triumph deadline. The same competitive-relocation dynamic recurs across the portfolio; temporal adjacency with the softening enforcement terms is recorded as fact, no causal claim made.

The jobs obligor is VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc. — alone. GAA §8.4(b): the MRO Lessee is "solely liable" for all performance clawbacks, paid directly to Triumph. The City's own clawback exposure covers city-breach events only and TERMINATES six months after final disbursement — but the City bears 50% of Triumph's attorneys' fees in any clawback enforcement against VT, with no cap stated. (This corrects the press's "either the city or ST" framing.)

The test: Tier 1 = 994 jobs (75% of 1,325) held as an ANNUAL AVERAGE for 7 of 10 years, in a review period that begins five years after Hangar 4's Date of Beneficial Occupancy; Tier 2 adds 331 on the same mechanics in a second 10-year period, with surplus-job banking. Clawback: $49,811.32 per shortfall job ($66M ÷ 1,325), tested at the END of each decade-long period, with compliance-plan intermediation first.

A wage floor exists: $44,461 average annual wage, excluding benefits, every year — and wage compliance is required for jobs to count as "maintained." It is an AVERAGE, not a minimum, and sits below the "$50,000 average" of the promotional record. The three-figure sequence is preserved: $44,461 (term sheets) → $45,394 (Feb-2019 memo) → $44,461 (executed).

Mobile transfers count: "No Project Jobs may be transferred by VT from other parts of the STATE OF FLORIDA" — Alabama is not Florida, so jobs moved from the Mobile operation are countable "net new" Project Jobs under this instrument. Recorded neutrally: standard Florida-statute framing, with a consequence the public narrative has never surfaced.

The record's single best documentary lever: GAA §7.3 deems all Back-up Data and §8.4 performance metrics "public records" under §119.011 — payroll records, employment reporting forms, quarterly RT-6 returns, audited financials, deliverable to Triumph on 10 days' request. The verified job counts the 2024 audit regime was announced to produce ALREADY EXIST as contractually designated public records held by Triumph.

The completion deadline passed: GAA §5.1 required Project Titan complete within six years of the Effective Date — April 29, 2025, day-for-day force-majeure extension (the definition expressly includes "epidemics"). Titan is not complete. Not a breach finding — a paper-trail finding: either force majeure carried the date, or an extension letter exists, or post-4/2025 disbursements need a basis. The documentation is a first-order wanted item (W-15).

§10.17: the Mayor (or designee) may amend, modify, or WAIVE any term on the City's behalf if not materially adverse to the City — non-material amendment authority sits with one office.

Comparing the October 2018 term sheets against the executed March/April 2019 instruments, the jobs-enforcement machinery moved in ONE direction at every point of change. Recorded as fact-by-comparison; no motive imputed — negotiation is negotiation. But the direction is uniform, and it is the portfolio's first DOCUMENTED instance of the term-sheet→instrument transition — the transition Birdon #367 is in today.

Grant amount: $56M → $66M (+$10M, tranched on future state receipts). City co-funding: ~$154.125M → ≥$144.125M (City share −$10M). Triumph share caps: 35%/27% → 40%/31.41% (Triumph carries more, earlier). CMAR guaranteed-maximum-price deadline: 2020-12-31 → 2021-12-31, moved a year before signing.

Tier 1 structure: create 994 jobs within 3 YEARS of Hangar 4 occupancy and maintain EACH job ≥3 years — became — a 5-year ramp-up, then a 10-year review period holding an ANNUAL AVERAGE of 994 for 7 of 10 years (creation window +2 years; per-job maintenance → averaged best-7-of-10). Tier 2's window grew six years and gained surplus-job banking.

Annual clawback triggers ELIMINATED: the term sheets repaid 1/5 of the grant in ANY YEAR the average fell below 795, and per-job amounts annually between 795 and 993; the executed instrument tests only at the END of each 10-year review period, with Compliance-Plan intermediation before termination remedies. The per-job rate grew with the grant: $42,264.15 → $49,811.32.

Escape valves widened: force-majeure triggers 2 → 7 (adding regulatory/policy change, air-service disruption, loss of a major key account, early fleet retirement, named hurricanes, and "tight labor market affecting recruitment"); Triumph sole-discretion waiver grounds 3 → 5 (adding policy change/customer loss and "demonstrated reasonable best efforts"). Unchanged: the $44,461 wage floor, the intra-Florida-only transfer exclusion, and the guaranty architecture (VT solely liable; Triumph third-party beneficiary of the MRO Lease; City bears 50% of enforcement fees).

The episode implicates labor-sourcing and LOCALNESS of jobs, not (on current evidence) the raw job count. The record holds three separate questions — count performance (claimed), composition/residency (contested), verification (announced, output unseen) — and does not collapse them.